Iran and post-US Afghanistan
Clearing the confusion around the border clash and investigating the future of Afghanistan as we know it

Yesterday on May 27th, 2023, there was a border clash between border guards of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) and militiamen of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA, better known as the ‘Taliban’). After seeing many on Twitter taking sides, accusing & slandering either of the governments as “US puppets”, cheering on tensions, and other mass hysteria, I have decided to write this long article to clear the air on what happened, provide some context, and my assessment of where things are headed.
What happened?
A few Taliban militiamen shot at an Iranian border post on Saturday, May 27. Iranian border guards retaliated with firing a few mortar shells at militiamen in the Afghan of the border. The altercation resulted in reportedly two Iranian border guards' [1] and one Taliban militiaman’s deaths, possibly more [2]. Iran temporarily shut down a few border crossings near the area affected by the minor clash.
So, why did this happen?
Nobody knows why exactly, as the militiamen were not ordered to carry out any such attack by the Taliban’s Central Government in Kabul. The IEA denies having given any order resulting in the attacks and border crossings/violations. To save face, Kabul claims that Iran shot first, though videos of Taliban militiamen shooting at and trespassing around Iranian installations near the border (see below) contradict this claim — what are these militiamen doing there if Iran shot first, shouldn’t it be the other way around?!
So anyways, why did this happen? There are some leads.
Tribalism
The biggest factor that might have been the cause of last Saturday's border clash could be tribalism and unprofessionalism in Taliban forces. Taliban units frequently act out of order and disregard/attack border checkpoints [3, 4]. Several border clashes have happened between IEA Taliban militiamen and Pakistani border guards. Taliban militiamen have reportedly shot at Pakistani construction workers and border guards in multiple incidents in 2021, 2022, and 2023. A recent incident in February 2023 led to a brief border closure in Torkham — the biggest border crossing between Afghanistan & Pakistan — similar to what is happening now between Iran and Afghanistan [4]. Despite such incidents, the IEA’s acting Prime Minister, Mawlawi Abdul Kabir, in a meeting with a Pakistani envoy in Kabul, said that Afghanistan wants “good relations based on good intentions with all its neighbors” [9].
This isn't something exclusive to the Taliban either. Similar clashes also happened under the former US puppet regime, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan [5, 6]. Afghan forces clashed with Pakistani border guards in numerous almost yearly incidents under the tenure of Ashraf Ghani. Their forces, the Afghan National Army (ANA), were also composed of undisciplined tribal soldiers who — despite being given ‘training’ by the US — were very unruly, undisciplined, and ultimately carried little loyalty to the central government. Instead, their ultimate loyalties remained with local commanders or tribal affiliations. The quick fall of the US-installed puppet government to the Taliban with mass defections and desertions during the 2021 US withdrawal demonstrated this fact.
This unprofessionalism of the Taliban’s tribal militias, lack of standardization, lack of widespread radio communication, or organized army protocols could have contributed to yesterday’s clash on the Iran-Afghanistan border. New statements from Iran’s semi-official Tasnim News agency states the following, citing an Iranian border security official:
“Yesterday [Saturday, May 27] a convoy of drug traffickers from the east was trying to enter our country's territory, which Iranian border guards would notice and engage with. In the wake of this clash, Taliban forces stationed at the border, who were unaware of the issue, intervene to shoot at Iranian forces, which leads to clashes between the two sides. Unfortunately, one of the border guards of our country was martyred and several other forces (Taliban) were killed, of which we do not have accurate figures.” [10]
If true, this highlights the accidental nature of the skirmish as Taliban militiamen intervened thinking Iranians were opening fire on other Taliban militiamen. This context also lines up with Kabul’s side of the story as well as mentioned above. Such an accident could have been prevented with proper standardized protocols and radio communication techniques found in professional militaries.
To further highlight this factor of tribalism, it is important to mention a recent trend of Taliban tribal infighting following their takeover of Afghanistan. Examples include the Uzbek Taliban disobeying and revolting against the Kabul central government between 2021-2022, alongside other ethnic conflicts within Taliban ranks such as between Tajiks & Pashtuns [7]. The Taliban have a Commission dedicated to cleaning up their forces of disobedience, the Clearing of Ranks Commission. The Commission removed almost 2,840 Taliban members from the Taliban’s ranks across 14 provinces as of January 16, 2022 (merely 5 months into the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan; likely much more by now) [7].
Significant segments of those removed were sympathizers of ISIS in Afghanistan, also known as “IS-KP” (Islamic State — Khorasan Province), as well as other sectarians, drug smugglers, and others who disturbed the peace. The Commission’s purge of corruption and disobedience was met with violence in some cases. Such a case was when Taliban fighters loyal to Safauddin, the local head of criminal investigations, clashed with Taliban fighters loyal to Salahuddin, the police chief for Maimay District, Badakhshan Province [7]. This clash reportedly occurred because the Commission wanted to remove the local Taliban intelligence official for disobeying orders.
Related to tribalism is the factor of sectarianism, which is present in the ranks of Taliban militiamen as mentioned above. Taliban Commander Abdul Hamid Khorasani, who recently virally on video threatened to “conquer Iran” & takfired Iranians as “false Muslims”, was sacked for endangering Afghanistan's national security interests with his comments [8]. Mr. Khorasani stated that his removal was due to “differences with the Taliban leadership”. The trouble stirred by Mr. Khorasani will be discussed in the next segment.
US intelligence involvement?
Given Taliban troubles of IS-KP infiltrating its ranks and its Clearing of Ranks Commission receiving violent pushback by some members of the Taliban [1], it wouldn't be surprising if US assets that infiltrated and/or are embedded in the Taliban could be responsible for causing the clashes and heightening tensions.
It is possible Abdul Hamid Khorasani, who was also removed from his previous command in Panjshir as Security Chief in March 2022 [2], is a US asset intentionally wrecking the Taliban government's internal security, national security, and public image/international standing. Mr. Khorasani was accused of being a corrupt warlord by Panjshir locals with IEA-appointed Panjshir governor’s spokesman Abubakar Sadeqi stating:
“Abdul Hameed Khurasani was fired as head of the security department of Panjshir. He has no official job in Panjshir. He wanted to cover his mess by joining the Islamic Emirate.” [2]
Abdul Hamid Khorasani also interestingly appeared on the British-owned, pro-Israel outlet Afghanistan International just days after he was dismissed from his post [3]. Afghanistan International is a sister channel of Iran International, one of the leading regime-change hawk outlets against Iran; just like its sister channel Afghanistan International is also a regime-change propaganda channel but aimed against the Taliban’s government. But alas, if not an asset, perhaps Mr. Khorasani is simply an incompetent & divisive sectarian figure who had improper conduct in his various government office positions.
There is also the factor of foreign bots externally amplifying messages of hostility between Iran and Afghanistan. Examples include NAFO accounts such as Visegrad24 who were cheering on the minor border incident [4].
Within the replies of Visegrad24, there were plenty of NAFO and Ukraine flag accounts & bots cheering on the Taliban over this minor border incident, the screenshot below showcases a sample of this general outlook. It is quite amusing since many of these same accounts mere weeks earlier were decrying the Taliban over their decisions with female education; some figures even calling for the US to “re-enter” Afghanistan to “save the women” [7]. Interestingly enough, it should be noteworthy that “protecting women’s rights” was one of the original casus-bellis for the US invasion in 2001 as seen in old State Department releases [8].
This display of tension stoking by the Western internet is displayed by another Western OSINT account “Terror_Alarm” with 80K+ followers. Quite amusing and incredible seeing 180-degree flips such as this, also very clear the division agenda being carried out.
There are also National Resistance Front (NRF) accounts such as Ahmad Massoud getting involved getting heavily botted tweets such as one below with 36K likes in less than a day [5]. For those unaware, Massoud is the now exiled leader of the failed anti-Taliban 2021 insurgency in Panjshir by the NRF — he is also the grandson of Ahmad Shah Massoud who led the original anti-Taliban Northern Alliance in the 1990s. His movement has significant political backing by the US and international liberalism.
Even several prominent Israeli Zionist accounts — with some degree of governmental or institutional backing — also partook in stoking tensions or spreading lies, gaining a thousand likes.
Here is a final compilation below containing a few other example tweets of people either outright lying or stoking tensions getting tens of thousands of likes.
There are of course Afghans and Iranians — the target of these social media campaigns — who also unfortunately inevitably fall for these lies and social media drummings for war. I will not include those as that is besides the point but they too got significant likes for falling into this discourse trap, thinking that one side is attacking the other.
It is abundantly clear that there is digital astroturfing taking place with people trying to stoke tensions, psychologically influence hysteria and sectarian conflict. Meanwhile parody (non-Afghan/Iranian) troll accounts also jump into further stir confusion such as the “Taliban Public Relations Department (PRD)” account, further contributing to online mess, hysteria, and tension stoking.
This is similar & analogous to Women Life Freedom bots astroturfing & constructing narratives against Iran getting hundreds of thousands of likes and pumping out almost a 330 million tweets in the month of September 2022 [6] alone despite much of Iran’s 88 million population not using Twitter. As of December 2022, “Ukraine” had only been mentioned 240 million times since February 2022, meanwhile “#BlackLivesMatter” had only been mentioned 83 million times over the last eight years [6]. Goes on to show the extent of which there is a bot army psychologically targeting Iran. Interestingly, many Women Life Freedom bots were similarly stoking tensions and involved in propagating videos such as Mr. Khorasani’s “war declaration” mentioned earlier. There is a triangle of relations between Iran’s reformists, the Women Life Freedom movement & other opposition, and the massive overseas opposition media war against Iran, although that will be investigated in a separate article at a later date (too much for one, already long article). Just be aware that these same opposition figures are now interestingly calling for escalating tensions with Afghanistan while also having some of their bots cheer on Taliban border incursions.
To conclude this segment, US intel is very likely involved in shaping online narratives given what activity all the NAFO or Women Life Freedom bots are up to. Meanwhile evidence for US involvement in ground-events remains ambiguous with the only main lead so far being the former Taliban commander Abdul Hamid Khorasani.
Pre-meditated agreement with the US?
This is a claim floated a lot on Twitter but evidence remains flimsy, so I doubt this is the case. Given the Taliban inheritance of large quantities of US equipment following the US withdrawal in July/August 2021 (see infographic below), some people are making the assertion that "this was no mistake" by the US and "was a US plan to launch an attack on Iran via the Taliban". I doubt this claim heavily as the US did try to sabotage as much equipment as they can while they quickly withdrew during the disorder and chaos of the final days of the Afghanistan War [1]. The state of the equipment is questionable with much of the equipment also being infantry transports — something inadequate on its own for any major offensive on a major country. Examples include the vast amount of sabotaged Blackhawk transport helicopters, Humvees, and armored cars/personnel carriers. According to Forbes, the US stripped all sensitive electronics in “all of its vehicles” that were abandoned [1]. Images also surfaced of damaged Blackhawk helicopters captured by the Taliban, laying in the tarmac of the Kabul airport.
These military vehicles require a substantial amount of maintenance, which the Taliban will likely not be able to provide even with foreign assistance. This maintenance of military vehicles requires technical expertise and access to specialized tools and spare parts. Prior to the Taliban takeover, the Afghan National Army leveraged contractor support for their technical expertise and American supply channels for the tools and spare parts. With the drawdown of NATO troops, many of these contractors opted to leave as well, resulting in many of the vehicles falling into a state of disrepair. Many analysts have blamed the poor state of their vehicles for the rapid collapse of the Afghan National Army. [1]
This is a similar issue Iran ran into following its 1979 Islamic Revolution. Despite inheriting the Shah’s arsenal of Western-made equipment, Iran had to resort to black market smuggling of parts, cannibalism of spare vehicles for parts, and reverse engineering to maintain its equipment. It is possible that the Taliban collaborate with Iran to some extent in order to maintain its own new US equipment, two years past the US withdrawal. Kabul may increase technical collaboration with Tehran as the Taliban seek to repair many of the sabotaged systems mentioned above, but don't have the technical knowhow [2, 3]. This is not anything new for Tehran as Russia has been reportedly sending Iran many American weapons systems it captured in its Special Military Operation in Ukraine [6], mainly for study and reverse engineering collaboration. Iran is very experienced in reverse engineering, modifying, and mass-producing US weapons for its own use, having been doing so for the last four decades.
It is possible that the Taliban send many systems to Iran for reverse engineering and technical support for their damaged equipment. Iran repaired and returned former Afghan National Army equipment & vehicles to the Taliban in June 2022 [4]. This was after some ANA units fled across the border with their equipment & vehicles to Iran in August 2021 as the Taliban rapidly advanced during the US withdrawal.
Lastly some suggest that attacking/damaging relations with Iran is a prerequisite for the Taliban getting former Afghan assets unfrozen by the US, referring to recent negotiations in Doha, Qatar. I.e. they allege the Taliban must abide by the Washington Consensus regarding Iran. This is possible but is pure speculation & I deem it unlikely as there is no evidence.
Water Dispute?
Many describe the recent clashes to be a case of "resource war". I deny this wording, but the water issue has a bit to do with the recent clash (slight tensions causing military/militia alertness), albeit it is not a direct cause nor related. Contextually, the Taliban several weeks ago decreased water flow via their dam of the Helmand/Hirmand River, which is shared between Iran and Afghanistan. Many in the Sistan & Baluchistan province of Iran rely on this river to provide for drinking water and irrigation. Almost one million Iranians (mainly Sunni Baluchis and Shia Persians) who live in the region were affected with 10,000 people having to immigrate out due to the water shortages caused by water altercations over the years.
The basis of water sharing was established in the 1973 Hirmand River Accords, but issues started when the US-installed post-2001 Afghan government under Ashraf Ghani broke with the treaty [1, 12]. Kabul and Tehran signed an agreement in 1973 that requires Afghanistan to annually release 850 million cubic meters of water to Iran through the Hirmand River. In March 2021 — merely 5 months before the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan — the US-installed government’s President Ashraf Ghani inaugurated the Kamal Khan Dam on the Hirmand River. The dam’s construction by US contractors started in 1974 but was quickly abandoned following the 1978 Communist coup in Afghanistan and decades of internal conflict; construction restarted in 2017 under Ashraf Ghani which was when problems began. Iran said that Afghanistan’s decision to cut Iran off from a major water source was not done in response to water scarcity, but due to Washington’s persistence on using “any means necessary” to put maximum pressure on Tehran [12].
The water issue subsided during the 2021 Taliban takeover. With US troops out of Afghanistan, the Taliban opened the dam to let water freely flow in exchange for purchasing Iranian oil [12]. This gave both countries what they wanted with the Taliban receiving energy and Iran receiving water and much needed dollars flowing in despite sanctions.
Issues rearose only May of 2023 this year, when Iran’s side of the river was heavily reduced in water volume. Iran's Foreign Ministry stated “factions within the Taliban” are sabotaging Tehran’s efforts to obtain its share of water from the Hirmand river, demanding the Taliban to abide by the 1973 treaty [2]. Iranian FM Amir Abdollahian stated “it’s not up to me or [IEA FM] Amir-Khan Muttaqi to decide how the water flows”, but these elements [2].
But the Taliban responded with claiming that there’s not enough water in Kajaki dam — another dam which contains an emergency reservoir of water, which Raisi requested the Taliban to flow — to allow water to flow towards Iran due to technical problems and drought [3]. Tehran rejects this argument and says it doesn’t accept this claim until a technical team from Iran visits the dam and makes a report, as other evidence suggests otherwise [3]. A spokesman of Iran’s Space Organization tweets that images taken by an Iranian satellite prove Afghanistan’s government has artificially changed the course of the Hirmand/Helmand River and built various dams/barriers preventing water from reaching Iran [4]. Iranian Minister of Interior, Ahmad Wahidi, said that the existing reports are “contrary to the claims made [by the Taliban], and that is why the [Iranian] officials' field visit is proposed and if there is truly no water, the issue will be resolved” [13].
Regardless of the ongoing water dispute — which both sides have reaffirmed will be solved with diplomacy (more on this later) — the recent border shootout is largely unwarranted, unrelated to, and unordered by the Kabul Central Government. Therefore, it doesn't make much sense for this minor border action conducted by the Taliban to be a premeditated one relating to the water dispute. Moreover, the context of Taliban-Iran relations prior to this incident doesn't make much sense/add up to explain this border incident.
As a brief recap of some major points in recent relations:
Iran was one of the Taliban's main suppliers of arms and funding during its insurgency phase, in addition to allowing Taliban fighters to take refuge/train in Iran [5]
Iran following the Taliban takeover returned ANA equipment (as mentioned earlier under ‘Premeditated agreement?’ section) [6]
Iran sent extensive aid to Afghanistan in 2021 and 2022 to help in postwar reconstruction and recovery from a major Earthquake in 2021 [7, 8, 9, 10]
Iran has also called for the US to unfreeze Afghanistan's assets frozen by the US following Taliban takeover, which diaspora Iranian opposition media such as Iran Intl seethed at [11].
Iran and Afghanistan have significant economic ties as briefly mentioned earlier with the example of Iran’s energy exports to the IEA. A second recent example is also the opening of the new Iran-Afghanistan railway link between Khaf and Herat three weeks ago on May 9 [14]. Iranian technicians continue to help assist Afghanistan develop its railway.
iven the actions by both sides, de-escalation and diplomacy will likely happen. The Taliban do not want to provoke Iran given recent proclamations of goodwill by their Foreign Ministry & their disciplinary actions against unruly commanders. Meanwhile, Iran has held back from responding in any serious manner to provocations by tribesmen and remains open to diplomacy.
Both countries have elements (with botted support on the American internet such as Twitter) who seek to escalate tensions. Iran's reformists — who don’t control any major national political offices in Iran anymore following Admiral Shamkhani’s dismissal from the National Security Council — influence lots of media, the economy, and social media discourse, also happen to itch for a conflict with the Taliban [1, 2] (which Ali Alizadeh extensively exposes in the cited livestream; note it is in Farsi; highly recommend his channel overall). The reason Iran’s reformists do this is because they are American aligned and seek to torpedo President Raeisi’s Look East doctrine and Eurasian integration between Iran, Russia, China, and others. Opposing the Taliban, in addition to promoting the JCPOA & Western trade, opposing China’s Belt & Road, liberalizing the economy, and other lines they take are all a part of that — but that’s a large separate topic worth its own discussion.
Despite this, many in Iran are also pro-Taliban and remain friendly with the Taliban and Afghan people. This includes much of the current government led by Iran’s Principalists, also known as the “Hardliners” or “conservatives”. One of Ayatollah Khamenei’s close associates and advisor, Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati, included the Taliban as a member of the ‘Axis of Resistance’ the following quote from August 2021:
“The countries of the resistance front constitute a group that is unprecedented in the history of the region and the world, and the main axis of that group is Iran. This route that has formed, the Yemen-Tehran-Baghdad-Al-Bukamal-Damascus-Beirut-Gaza [route], constitutes the resistance axis. With Iran as the focal point, following the Islamic Revolution a group formed in the region that is taking steps towards resistance, independence and freedom. I foresee a very good future for this group. Afghanistan is of course part of this group [the Axis of Resistance], and its most important victory is the expulsion of America.” [8]
Dr. Velayati went on to praise Afghanistan and the Taliban’s “humiliating expulsion” of US forces and tradition of resistance to great powers such as Britain, Russia, and the US [8]. Hardliner newspaper outlets such as Kayhan have also pushed for recognition and full alliance of the Taliban in the past week.
There are of course also anti-Iran sectarian and chauvinist elements within the Taliban such as Mr. Khorasani, but he was dismissed, as were thousands of others by the Commission mentioned earlier. The Taliban must also overcome the difficulties of managing a real state and not just a small guerilla force. Centralization is a major issue, with the formation of the Commission and its actions being a step in the right direction. Reigning in the autonomy of its tribal forces and their warlord commanders, as well as professionalizing the armed forces should be major goals for the new Afghan state.
Rebuilding also is the second main issue. It would not make any sense for the Taliban to geopolitically isolate itself from Eurasian integration by attacking Iran — such acts are contrary to its desire to rebuild the country from four decades of constant warfare. Afghanistan — who is a landlocked, mountainous country — relies on Pakistan and especially Iran for imports of necessary foreign goods from overseas as well as being connected to the global economy. Much of Afghanistan’s non-neighbor foreign imports flow through Iran’s port of Chabahar to Afghanistan [9]. This is why the US avoided sanctioning Chabahar for a long while since it wanted the US installed Karzai/Ghani Afghan government to survive economically [9]. Conflict with its neighbors will destroy the already frail Afghan economy. If Afghanistan rejects and attacks Eurasian integration with Iran, China, and Russia, the only other option that leaves it for receiving investment funds for reconstruction is Washington. And Washington cannot come save a landlocked country like Afghanistan in a hypothetical economic or military conflict scenario with Iran; they already struggle with Ukraine against Russia. Any conflict with Iran is geopolitical suicide for the Taliban.
The Taliban also have many pro-Iran elements who reciprocate friendly gestures to Iran. One such example is the mayor of Herat who recently praised Qasem Soleimani as a “Martyr... who did not belong to one country, but to all Islamic countries.” [3]. Border crossings which closed yesterday have reopened today, May 28 [4]. The Taliban leadership — who Mr. Khorasani seethingly stated his “disagreements with them” caused his dismissal — also remains committed to maintaining amicable relations with Tehran as stated countless times in this article.
Talks continue behind the scenes between Iran and the Taliban, the fact that there is continued communication, meetings, & close contact between both sides' military (IRGC & Talib Defense Ministry) and diplomatic (Foreign ministries/consulates) channels is indication that there won't be conflict [5]. In a public political commission held by the Afghan Prime Minister today on May 28, the PM called reinstating and ratifying the 1973 Hirmand River Accords the best solution to the present issue [6]. He also reaffirmed Afghanistan’s desire for good, neighborly relations with Iran with diplomacy and dialogue being the way forward [6]. Iran has also reopened the border today, May 28 after closing it yesterday with border guards reporting that the situation is calm and under control [7]. Iranian general Kioumars Heydari and deputy chief of Iranian law enforcement Ghasem Rezaei also held a joint meeting with Taliban officials in Zabol city on May 28, discussing how to prevent such incidents from taking place in the future [10]. At the end of the day, this event hardly concerns anyone except those who live locally along the Afghan-Iranian border — even Iranians, in places like Tabriz in Western Iran, are not affected by this event at all. Let alone Americans or anyone else rushing to conclusions, taking sides, or instigating conflict online.
I am confident for these reasons that this minor dispute will be solved and it will be forgotten in due time as a minor footnote of history.
June 5th, 2023, Editor’s Update: Taliban diplomat Fazl Mohammad Haqqani, the Taliban representative in Tehran, was photographed attending the 34th anniversary of the passing of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. This effectively marks the complete de-escalation of the incident and normalcy of relations. [11]
References cited by section:
“What Happened?”
[1] https://twitter.com/fresh_sadegh/status/1662532205086748674?t=ES-Swfe0mP42RY7SHf8NeA&s=19“So, Why Did This Happen? Section 1: Tribalism”
[3] Residents Report Gunfire on Afghanistan-Pakistan border https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/main-afghan-pakistani-border-crossing-closed-residents-report-gunfire-2023-02-20/[4] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-63941387
[5] https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/05/world/asia/afghanistan-pakistan-border.html
[6] https://www.reuters.com/article/pakistan-afghanistan-idINL3N0ZH3UP20150701
[7] https://www.iswresearch.org/2022/01/taliban-government-responds-to-uzbek.html
[8] https://twitter.com/Spriter99880/status/1660737122351960065
[9] Kabul Wants Good Relations with Neighbors: Acting PM | TOLOnews
“So, Why Did This Happen? Section 2: US Intelligence involved?”
[1] https://www.iswresearch.org/2022/01/taliban-government-responds-to-uzbek.html[2] Khurasani Dismissed as Panjshir Security Chief: Local Officials
https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-177198[3] Abdul Hamid Khorsani gives interview to Afghanistan International https://twitter.com/AFIntlBrk/status/1662672160404520960
[4] Visegrad 24 comments on Iran-Afghan border incident https://twitter.com/visegrad24/status/1662509571334651905
[5] https://twitter.com/hajdogin/status/1662782426400038912?s=19
[6] https://www.vox.com/world/2022/12/12/23498870/iran-protests-information-war-bots-trolls-propaganda
“So, Why Did This Happen? Section 3: Pre-meditated agreement with the US?”
[1] https://www.forbes.com/sites/vikrammittal/2021/09/08/afghanistan-graveyard-of-equipment/?sh=3242f976a529[2] https://gulfif.org/to-engage-or-not-to-engage-iran-and-the-new-taliban/
[4] Iran returns Afghan military equipment to Taliban, including US-supplied gear https://amwaj.media/media-monitor/military-equipment-taliban
[5] Taliban accuse US of destroying equipment including helicopters | Ariana News
[6] Russia Sending US Weapons Captured in Ukraine to Iran: Report (businessinsider.com)
“So, Why Did This Happen? Section 4: Water Disputes?”
[1] https://twitter.com/fresh_sadegh/status/1659239250611564544[2] https://twitter.com/fresh_sadegh/status/1659239190498770965
[3] https://twitter.com/fresh_sadegh/status/1659239305808687104
[4] https://twitter.com/HosseinDalirian/status/1659178129523449856
[5] Book: The Taliban at War: 2001-2018 (2019), Figure 21: External funding for Taliban insurgency
[6] https://amwaj.media/media-monitor/military-equipment-taliban
[7] https://www.farsnews.ir/en/news/14001007000803/Iranian-Sends-Mre-Hmaniarian-Aid-Afghanisan
[8] https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/471353/Iran-has-so-far-sent-30-aid-convoy-to-Afghanistan-envoy
[11] Iran Calls For Freeing Afghanistan's Frozen Assets, Provide Aid | Iran Intl https://www.iranintl.com/en/20211220366972
[13] Commission Says 1973 Treaty is Best Solution for Helmand River Dispute | TOLOnews
[14] First Iranian freight train arrives in Afghanistan's Herat - Mehr News Agency
“So what will happen next?”
[1] Iran-Taliban border conflict: Who is behind this? Jedaal program with Ali Alizadeh
https://www.youtube.com/live/Oflo_Ua8q50?feature=share[2] https://twitter.com/fresh_sadegh/status/1662709764155924480
[3] https://twitter.com/AF_Sahartv/status/1478325338644045825
[4] https://twitter.com/fresh_sadegh/status/1662812775549108227
[5] https://twitter.com/neccia1/status/1662662602504261634
[6] Commission Says 1973 Treaty is Best Solution for Helmand River Dispute | TOLOnews
[7] https://twitter.com/fresh_sadegh/status/1662812775549108227
[8] Iranian Official: Iran Leads An Unprecedented Axis
[9] Border Tensions with Taliban — Geopolitics with Mohammad Nadimi
https://www.youtube.com/live/bgfzkxJqMd0?feature=share[11] Taliban Diplomat Attends Khomeini's Death Anniversary (bnn.network)
Non-sensational and levelheaded overview 👍
Stellar write up and explanation of not just only the situation but also Iran-Taliban relationship. It always seems strange to me that how come Iran and Afghanistan could escalated this quickly, even over crucial thing as water, in matter of literal days. It's impossible, that's not how geopolitic events unfolds.
Turned out this was all propaganda by the terminally online Iranian opposition and liberals. That numbers speaks volume, literally. TBH, any groups that still put that much effort in online campaigns are just wasting their own money. Even both Maidan and Arab Spring requires a lot of legwork on the ground to make it takes off the way it did.